This week, Jonathan Bennett, Doc Searls, and Jeff Massie talk about Deepseek, technical solutions to Terms of Service abuse, and more!
Continue reading “FLOSS Weekly Episode 818: I Don’t Care About The Roman Empire”
This week, Jonathan Bennett, Doc Searls, and Jeff Massie talk about Deepseek, technical solutions to Terms of Service abuse, and more!
Continue reading “FLOSS Weekly Episode 818: I Don’t Care About The Roman Empire”
Cisco’s ClamAV has a heap-based buffer overflow in its OLE2 file scanning. That’s a big deal, because ClamAV is used to scan file attachments on incoming emails. All it takes to trigger the vulnerability is to send a malicious file through an email system that uses ClamAV.
The exact vulnerability is a string termination check that can fail to trigger, leading to a buffer over-read. That’s a lot better than a buffer overflow while writing to memory. That detail is why this vulnerability is strictly a Denial of Service problem. The memory read results in process termination, presumably a segfault for reading protected memory. There are Proof of Concepts (PoCs) available, but so far no reports of the vulnerability being used in the wild.
Continue reading “This Week In Security: ClamAV, The AMD Leak, And The Unencrypted Power Grid”
This week, Jonathan Bennett and Dan Lynch chat with Stefano Zacchiroli about Debian and Software Heritage!
Continue reading “FLOSS Weekly Episode 817: Incompatible With Reality”
Up first, go check your machines for the rsync
version, and your servers for an exposed rsync
instance. While there are some security fixes for clients in release 3.4.0, the buffer overflow in the server-side rsync daemon is the definite standout. The disclosure text includes this bit of nightmare fuel: “an attacker only requires anonymous read access to a rsync
server, such as a public mirror, to execute arbitrary code on the machine the server is running on.”
A naive search on Shodan shows a whopping 664,955 results for rsync servers on the Internet. Red Hat’s analysis gives us a bit more information. The checksum length is specified by the remote client, and an invalid length isn’t properly rejected by the server. The effect is that an attacker can write up to 48 bytes into the heap beyond the normal checksum buffer space. The particularly dangerous case is also the default: anonymous access for file retrieval. Red Hat has not identified a mitigation beyond blocking access.
If you run servers or forward ports, it’s time to look at ports 873 and 8873 for anything listening. And since that’s not the only problem fixed, it’s really just time to update to rsync 3.4.0 everywhere you can. While there aren’t any reports of this being exploited in the wild, it seems like attempts are inevitable. As rsync
is sometimes used in embedded systems and shipped as part of appliances, this particular bug threatens to have quite the long tail. Continue reading “This Week In Security: Rsync, SSO, And Pentesting Mushrooms”
This week, Jonathan Bennett and Aaron Newcomb chat with Simon Phipps and Stefano Maffulli about Open Source AI. Why did we need a new definition? Has it been controversial? And why did OSI step into this particular conversation?
The mad lads at watchTowr are back with their unique blend of zany humor and impressive security research. And this time, it’s the curious case of backdoors within popular backdoors, and the list of unclaimed domains that malicious software would just love to contact.
OK, that needs some explanation. We’re mainly talking about web shells here. Those are the bits of code that get uploaded to a web server, that provide remote access to the computer. The typical example is a web application that allows unrestricted uploads. If an attacker can upload a PHP file to a folder where .php files are used to serve web pages, accessing that endpoint runs the arbitrary PHP code. Upload a web shell, and accessing that endpoint gives a command line interface into the machine.
The quirk here is that most attackers don’t write their own tools. And often times those tools have special, undocumented features, like loading a zero-size image from a .ru domain. The webshell developer couldn’t be bothered to actually do the legwork of breaking into servers, so instead added this little dial-home feature, to report on where to find all those newly backdoored machines. Yes, many of the popular backdoors are themselves backdoored.
This brings us to what watchTowr researchers discovered — many of those backdoor domains were either never registered, or the registration has been allowed to expire. So they did what any team of researchers would do: Buy up all the available backdoor domains, set up a logging server, and just see what happens. And what happened was thousands of compromised machines checking in at these old domains. Among the 4000+ unique systems, there were a total of 4 .gov. domains from governments in Bangladesh, Nigeria, and China. It’s an interesting romp through old backdoors, and a good look at the state of still-compromised machines.
This week, Jonathan Bennett and Randal chat with Matija Å uklje about Open Source and the Law! How do Open Source projects handle liability, what should a Contributor License Agreement (CLA) look like, and where can an individual or project turn for legal help?
Continue reading “FLOSS Weekly Episode 815: You Win Some, You Lose Some”